IN our clime, due to its faux pax genetic code of existence, of which offshoot witnesses scorning of pyrrhic victory; if need be, freeing and deifying nine murderous Barn-abases in order to hang innocent Jesus, have witnessed of recent time, the invocation of the extant jurisdiction of the Code of Conduct TribunalTo what extent the protagonist of the current makabe dance will go, is beyond the confine of this intellectual exercise.But suffice it to say that the Code of Conduct Bureau is a constitutional creation. It is established by Section 153 (1) of the Constitution along with thirteen other bodies.Section 153(2) provides that 'The composition and powers of each body established by subsection (1) of this section are as contained in part 1 of the third schedule of this Constitution.The relation of the Constitution and its seven schedules has been stated as follows by Breth L. J. (the late Lord Esher M. R) in Att. Gen. V. Lamplough (1878) 3 Ex. D. 214 at page 279.'The schedule is as mush part of the statute, and is as mush an enactment, as any other part'.Couched in almost identical terms as Sec. 153(1) and paragraph 15 (1) of the fifth schedule to the Constitution, the provision in the Act that 'there is hereby established a Bureau to the known as the Code of Conduct Bureau' (Section 1(1) or that' there is hereby established a Tribunal to be known as Code of Conduct Tribunal' Section 20(1)).In line with the rule of certainty enshrine under Sec. 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution. The provisions of paragraph 18 of the fifth schedule and Section 23 of the Act with (minor variations, are identical) specifically provide the sanctions the tribunal can mete out.18(1) where the Code of Conduct Tribunal finds a public officer guilty of contravention of any of the provision of this code (or of the Act) it shall impose upon that officer any of the punishments specified under sub- paragraph (2) of this paragraph (sub-section(2) of this section (and such other punishment as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.(2)The punishment, which the Code of Conduct Tribunal may impose shall include any of the following:(a)Vacation of office or seat in any legislative house, as case may be;(b)Disqualification from membership of any legislative house and from the holding of any public office for period not exceeding ten years: and(c)Seizure and forfeiture to the State of any property acquired in abuse or corruption of office.(3)The sanctions mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) hereof (or subsection (2) of this section) shall be without prejudice to the penalties that may be imposed by any law where the conduct is also a criminal offence.It is trite that where a provision of Constitution or statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its literal and direct meaning. See Abubakar V. Yaraduah (2008) 19 NWLR (pt. 1120) P 1 @ 94 para. E. G. 132 paras. E ' G, 190 paras. A ' D. 213 para. G. Owners of the M. V. Arabella V. NDIC (2008) All FWLR (pt. 431) P. 1208 @ 1231 ' 1232 para. G- H. Awolowo V. Shagari (1979) 6-9 S. C. 51.It should be noted that by ordinary construction of the above statute that the sanction or punishment the Code of Conduct Tribunal can mete out to suspected offenders are disciplinary rather than punitive.This view is reinforced by the provision in paragraph 18 (6) (Section 23 (6), which says.'Nothing in this paragraph shall prejudice the prosecution of a public officer punished under this paragraph or preclude such officer from being prosecuted or punished for an offence in Court of law'.The provision in paragraph 18(6) (section 23(6) seems conclusive that paragraph 18(1), (2) and (3) confers no power on the Code of Conduct Tribunal to try and determine criminal charges against a person, and that the penalties therein mentioned are not punishments for a criminal offences, as otherwise it will contradict or conflict with the prohibition against double jeopardy in Section 36(9) of the Constitution, which says:'No person who shows that he has been tried by any court of competent jurisdiction or tribunal for a criminal offence and either convicted or acquitted shall again be tried for that offence or for a criminal offence having the same ingredients as that offence save upon the Order of a superior Court'.The view of the matter here canvassed is also supported and is certainly not contradicted, by paragraph 18 (3), (section 23 (3), already quoted, which seems clearly to contemplate trial and punishment by a Court not the Code of Conduct Tribunal 'where the conduct is also a criminal offence'.Thus it inexorably follows that the power granted to the Code of Conduct Tribunal by the Act, Cap C15 cannot extend to imposing punishments, therefore like committal to imprisonment.To reinforce the legal incapacity of Code of Conduct Tribunal of their lack of Judicial power of deprivation of ones right to liberty; it should be noted that conviction by a Tribunal (which is not a Court) is not a ground for deprivation of personal liberty by detention or imprisonment for a criminal offence under section 35 (1) (a) of the Constitution.As the latter provision is the one spelling out the constitutional permitted grounds for the deprivation of personal liberty by detention or imprisonment; the sophistic argument of subsuming of the Code of Conduct Tribunal under 'Tribunal' in Section 36 (4) of the Constitution is of no legal effect whatever, as conviction and sentence by such a Tribunal is not a constitutionally permitted ground for detention or imprisonment. This conclusion is reinforced by the vesting of Judicial power in the Courts, with the consequence of precluding trial, conviction and punishment for criminal offences by a Tribunal which is not specified in section 6(5) of the 1999 Constitution.Also, legislative incapacity of the National Assembly in regards to the articulated impotency of the punitive sanctions the Code of Conduct Tribunal can dish out can be seen; in that, it is trite that jurisdiction of Courts or tribunals conferred upon them by statute are as permitted by the Constitution. See Osadebe V. Att. Gen. Bendel State (1991) 1 NWLR (pt 169) 525.It is true that paragraph 15 (4) of the fifth schedule of the Constitution empowers the National Assembly 'by law to confer on the Code of Conduct Tribunal such additional powers as may appear to it to be necessary to enable it more effectively to discharge the function conferred on its this schedule'.But the National Assembly cannot, by virtue of this provision, confer on the Tribunal additional Powers (such as of committal to prisons) that are inconsistent with the provisions in the body of the Constitution. Since under theSection 1 (1)&(3) - that provides in the event of inconsistency between a provision in the one in the body of the Constitution and any other law, the former prevails.' Ikoroha practices law in Aba, Abia State.
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